LESSONS FROM OUTLAWS
LAURA S. UNDERKUFFLER
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In response to Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095 (2007).
1

In Property Outlaws, Eduardo Peñalver and Sonia Katyal set out an
ambitious goal. Challenging both popular and legal assumptions,
they attempt to reshape the image of those who deliberately violate
the property rights of others. The gist of their argument is that these
lawbreakers are not villains, but heroes—and that this is true regardless of whether we consider their actions from a social, economic, or
legal point of view.
This agenda is a tall order. Lawbreakers generally are not a favored segment of society, and property laws—which provide a deeply
felt need for individual security—would seem to be particularly important to uphold. Indeed, the overwhelming image of property lawbreakers is negative. As Peñalver and Katyal acknowledge, a trespasser
in popular culture and common law is a “transgressor, a law-breaker; a
2
wrong-doer, [a] sinner, [an] offender.” Indeed, “[i]n early modern
England, landowners frequently left ‘man traps’ and ‘spring guns’
3
along boundary lines to discourage trespass on their lands.” Although the law might discourage such deadly self-help measures today, the idea that a trespasser is a wrongdoer who gets what he deserves is still immortalized in the myths of popular culture and in the
4
spirit of the law.
How, then, can we see property lawbreakers in positive terms?
Peñalver and Katyal ground their positive view of property lawbreakers
in the notion that legal reform is a constant necessity. By their account, property lawbreakers play “[a] powerful, and at times ironic,
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role . . . in the process of fostering the evolution of property [law].”
Although we tend to think of property law as unchanging and forever
6
protecting, in reality, property law–-like all law—must be dynamic.
Social and economic forces continually require us to rethink the collective judgments that we have written into law. Citing “expressive”
property lawbreakers, who intend to send a message about the perceived injustice of existing property arrangements (such as Native
American activists and black civil rights activists who seized property to
7
dramatize their views), and “acquisitive” property lawbreakers, who
intend to acquire the underutilized land of others (such as homesteaders in the old American West and contemporary squatters in
8
American cities), Peñalver and Katyal point out that property lawbreakers may in fact be an important force in achieving larger social
9
and economic goals that “ossified” property rules otherwise resist.
Once it is recognized that property lawbreakers may play a desirable role, an obvious question arises: how do we determine which activities by property lawbreakers are “positive,” and which are not? It is
clear that Peñalver and Katyal do not endow all property lawbreakers
with this positive cast. These authors are not anarchists; they recognize that there are distinct costs—in the undermining of the idea of
the rule of law, and in the demoralization of other property owners
and aspirants—that follow from rewarding individuals who flout the
10
rights of others with new rights for themselves. The key, then, is to
distinguish positive or desirable property lawbreaking from that which
is not. What precisely, in this context, separates the valuable “wheat”
from the reprehensible “chaff”? Since property rights are intended to
protect all property holdings from external threats, how do we know
when these threats should be repulsed, and when not?
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From Peñalver and Katyal’s discussion of positive property lawbreaking, two general justifications for these activities emerge. These
are what we might call (a) efficiency reasons, by which property outlaws
are tolerated because their acts use land more efficiently or inten11
sively; and (b) rectification reasons, by which property outlaws are tolerated because their acts protest past injustice, and there is general
12
recognition of the legitimacy of their rectification claims.
Consider, as do Peñalver and Katyal, squatters who established
homes in abandoned inner-city buildings in the 1970s and 1980s, and
adverse possessors who claimed title to vast tracts of land owned by absentee private and public owners in the nineteenth-century American
West. Efficiency and rectification considerations advanced the toleration of their claims; land which was not being productively used (and,
inferentially, was owned by wealthy speculators or an indifferent gov13
ernment) was being put to good use by others. Civil rights activists in
the 1960s who occupied lunch counters and public buildings received
widespread support because of the perceived truth of their rectification arguments: the system of legal segregation that pervaded the
South at that time denied black Americans equal rights to property
14
and its benefits. Widespread public sympathy in 1969 with Native
American activists who occupied the abandoned federal property of
Alcatraz Island was due both to the rectification reasons that the activists advanced (that the land, from a historical point of view, was theirs)
and efficiency reasons (that the land, having been abandoned, had no
15
current useful role). Clearly, the public’s response would not have
been the same had they occupied an active federal naval base or the
public’s favorite national park.
The descriptions by Peñalver and Katyal of these property lawbreakers and our reasons for tolerating them ring true, and are fascinating reading. There is no doubt, as the authors point out, that
property lawbreakers act for both personal acquisitive and ideological
reasons, and that public toleration of property lawbreaking is
grounded in both economic models privileging “productive” use of
16
land and public acknowledgment (on occasion) of historic injustice
11
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done to particular groups. There are, in addition, other reasons that
can be advanced for the toleration of property lawbreakers, as reflected in the law of adverse possession. These include observations
that third parties should be able to rely on the assumption that the
occupants of land are titleholders if they have occupied the land long
enough; and that human beings who have occupied land for long periods will become deeply rooted in that land and will therefore resist
dispossession, whether they came by the property legally or not.
However, as convincing as all of these reasons for our toleration of
property outlaws are, something still seems to be missing. Although
efficiency is important in property arrangements, simple efficiency
reasons for property lawbreaking are not as powerful as they might, at
first blush, seem to be. It is true that property lawbreakers are often
tolerated when they put land to a better (more intensive) use. However, most land could probably be used more efficiently, or more intensively, if nonowners were given the chance. Farm fields could become home sites, and private woods could become parks. Yet we do
not allow this. In fact, efficiency arguments for property lawbreaking
are very selectively honored.
The same is true for rectification claims for prior social and economic injustices. Not all groups who have experienced injustice are
legitimate candidates for tolerated property lawbreaking in the public
mind. For instance, most observers would probably place the grievances of Japanese Americans interned during World War II into a different, monetarily compensable category. One cannot imagine tremendous public sympathy if these victims or their descendants
illegally occupied public or private land to dramatize their claims,
however just their arguments. So, what is this additional element—in
addition to efficiency and rectification reasons—that pushes us to
sympathize with property lawbreakers and to selectively tolerate their
claims? Peñalver and Katyal hint at what this might be. Intentional
property lawbreaking, they write, is “a strategy employed by those who
cannot afford to file civil suits or whose voice in the legislative process
17
is too weak to attract the attention of lawmakers.” It is appealing “to
18
the powerless and [the] marginal.” It is “a tool of the little people—
19
of the ‘have-nots.’” It is used by “those [who are] disenfranchised by
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the existing property system,” and who “flout[] the law in hopes of
20
achieving their goals.”
We thus have two different observations, juxtaposed. First, property lawbreakers are more tolerated in actuality than property laws
and the mythology of their protection would predict. Second, those
who engage in tolerated property lawbreaking are often the disenfranchised, the propertyless, the “have-nots” in the property world.
At this point we must pause. Are these simply two unrelated observations? Or does this mean that we (as a society) tolerate property
lawbreaking because the lawbreakers are those who are losers under
the existing regime of property and entitlements, while the targeted
owners are winners under the same regime? Put another way, do we
have different ideas about the protection that property should afford,
depending on the identities of the wrongdoers and the titleholders?
The claim that the identities of the property wrongdoers or titleholders affect the outcome of property lawbreaking cases is clearly not
true across the board. For instance, a boundary encroacher can obtain title through adverse possession whether the encroacher is penniless or rich, or whether the titleholder owns a thousand acres or one.
Indeed, Peñalver and Katyal are very cautious in their possible endorsement of identity attitudes, even as they point out hints of such
21
notions in popular culture and law. For instance, we generally believe that those who steal to survive without threatening the lives of
22
others are less culpable than other, more menacing criminals, and
the philosophical antecedents of Western, liberal democratic law in23
clude acknowledgment of the duty of the rich to share with the poor.
Why are Peñalver and Katyal so cautious? Why do they seemingly
feel the need, for instance, to camouflage rawly redistributive notions
in less controversial theories, such as a desire to enhance social productivity or to facilitate “involuntary transfers . . . when there is reason
to believe that the lawbreaker places a higher value on the prop24
erty . . . than the true owner” does?
In this caution, of course, Peñalver and Katyal are not alone. All
of us writing in the field of property law and theory are reticent to
20
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champion broadly redistributive notions, or (in this context) to imply
that property protection afforded by law depends on the “wealth identities” of either the property lawbreaker or titleholder. We want, after
all, to be heard, not offhandedly dismissed. And, as Peñalver and
Katyal note, an argument that the rights of property lawbreakers or
titleholders should be grounded in their economic status “sounds
25
fairly radical in the abstract.”
The underlying problem that theorists and others face is that
property embodies a deep and inherent paradox. On the one hand,
property by its very nature embodies conscious, brutal, distributive deci26
sions. When we are considering the fate of external, physical, finite
resources, such as land and all that it yields, property is a zero-sum
game. If we acknowledge the “rights” of some individuals in these resources, we deny the “rights” of others. When we decide (and decide
we must) who owns a building, who will farm the land, and whose
mouths are fed, we are making distributive decisions, whether we like
it or not. Property law design and enforcement cannot avoid this. It
is a continual process of serious, deliberate, distributional decision
making.
And yet—and here is the paradox—protection is also the essence
of property. The promise of property law, and its critical social function, is to protect what it identifies as ours. Whatever the distributional
fairness or unfairness that may exist, whatever the vagaries of the moment, property law promises that entitlements will not change. If I
own a building, or I own land, I assume that it is mine. And this is
true regardless of my needs relative to those of others. There are security, stability, and incentives to invest that are promised by these
laws.
The genius of Property Outlaws is that it presents this paradox in a
context that all of us recognize, and in a way that makes it real. Each
of us knows of the power and sanctity of rights, titles, and other legal
emoluments. We think far less, on a daily basis, about when and how
all of these assumptions must yield. Property Outlaws reminds us of
how we, as a society, accept, on some deep level, the reality of both
notions. In addition, by so vividly portraying our past actions, it also
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shows us that we can afford (perhaps) to be more giving to the poor
and dispossessed among us than we might otherwise suppose.
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